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Abstract
Shareholder activism increases the non-target firm’s outside option and reduces its CEO’s
outside option, which leads to higher firm profit and lower CEO compensation. Due to this
positive externality, the activist’s intervention is inefficiently low. Several extensions further
generate a number of novel insights: The liquidity of the CEO talent market exacerbates the
externality; common ownership alleviates the externality but exacerbates the free-rider prob-
lem, ultimately reducing market efficiency; regulating activists’ interventions decreases market
efficiency when similar firms compete for different CEO talents.
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1 Introduction
The rise of shareholder activism since 1980s has been seen as a major force in corporate gover-
nance. Activists initiate changes in target firms by tearing down takeover defense, ousting CEOs,
changing board structure, and challenging executive compensation plans. Recent empirical evi-
dence shows that the impact of shareholder activism reaches beyond target firms, as industry peers
make similar improvements and changes, generating significant financial and real effects (Zhu,
2013; Aslan and Kumar, 2016; Bourveau and Schoenfeld, 2017; Gantchev et al., Forthcoming;
Feng et al., 2018).
This paper takes a new look at the positive externality of shareholder activism. While existing
literature emphasizes the product market competition and the threat of intervention as the main
channels for externalities, I draw attention to the factor market competition, namely, the compe-
tition for CEO talent. I show that shareholder activism generates positive externalities because
both firms and CEOs’ outside options are endogenously determined and interlinked in the mar-
ket equilibrium. I derive an activist’s optimal level of intervention and discuss its implications on
market efficiency. I further study how the liquidity of the CEO talent market, common ownership
(when an activist holds ownership stakes in multiple firms), and regulation affect the efficiency of
shareholder activism.
Specifically, I consider one activist, two firms, and three CEOs in a three-period model. Firms
are the same ex ante and CEOs have different talents. In the first period, the activist launches
a costly activism campaign to reduce the target firm’s governance deficiencies such as removing
poison pills, declassifying the board, increasing board independence, and adopting confidential
shareholder voting. In the second period, firms of different governance deficiencies match with
CEOs of different talents. Equilibrium matching patterns, outside options, and payoffs are de-
termined in this period. In the third period, each CEO produces a stochastic cash flow, and the
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marginal product of CEO talent increases with firm size. The cash flow can only be observed by
the CEO, who reports it to the firm. The firm monitors the CEO by auditing her report, and the
effectiveness of monitoring decreases with the firm’s governance deficiencies.1
In equilibrium, the target firm—with governance deficiencies reduced by the activist—matches
with a CEO of lower talent. Intuitively, lower governance deficiencies lead to more effective mon-
itoring and lower CEO compensation, which reduces the firm’s competitiveness for CEO talent.
However, despite matching with a less talented CEO, the target firm earns a higher profit than the
non-target firm because the gain from more effective monitoring and lower CEO compensation
outweighs the loss from matching with a less talented CEO.
An important insight from the model is that shareholder activism generates a positive exter-
nality to the non-target firm through the market for CEO talent. Intuitively, the non-target firm’s
outside option is determined by its profit from deviating to match with the less talented CEO at the
target firm, and the non-target CEO’s outside option is determined by her wage from deviating to
match with the target firm. Shareholder activism increases the target firm’s profit and lowers its
CEO’s wage, which increases the non-target firm’s deviation profit and reduces its CEO’s devia-
tion wage. Thus, shareholder activism leads to higher firm profit and lower CEO compensation at
the non-target firm. Due to this positive externality, the activist sets inefficiently high governance
deficiencies at the target firm.
I proceed to discuss how the liquidity of the CEO talent market affects the shareholder ac-
tivism externality. When the CEO talent market becomes more liquid—due to more transferable
CEO talent or smaller search frictions—the externality becomes more severe. Intuitively, when
the CEO talent market is more liquid, the non-target firm and its CEO’s outside options are more
linked to the target firm. This increased linkage increases the inefficiency of shareholder activism.
1For example, monitoring is less effective when the lack of board independence, a form of governance deficiencies,
is higher.
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The empirical literature shows that CEO talents have become more transferable and outside hires
are more pervasive over the last several decades (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik 2004; Custódio et al.
2013), thus, the shareholder activism externality plays an increasingly important role in determin-
ing market efficiency.
Next, I discuss shareholder activism under common ownership (when an activist cross-holds
multiple firms). It is not clear whether common ownership increases or decreases the efficiency of
shareholder activism: Common ownership internalizes the positive externality by holding both the
target and non-target firm; however, it also reduces the activist’s stakes at the target firm, which
exacerbates free-riding from non-activist shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986).
To understand this tradeoff, I compare a cross-holding activist with a blockholder activist who
optimally allocates her stakes in the target and non-target firm. The comparison generates two
findings. First, the blockholder activist optimally concentrates all her stakes in the target firm.
Thus, the need to internalize the externality in shareholder activism is unlikely to account for the
rise of common ownership over the last several decades. Second, the cross-holding activist, who
allocates shares in the non-target firm, sets higher governance deficiencies than the blockholder
activist. Thus, common ownership exacerbates the inefficiency of shareholder activism.
Finally, I examine whether regulation can improve the efficiency of shareholder activism. I
consider a regulator mandating a universal governance deficiency ceiling on two firms of different
sizes, with two activists launching activism campaigns in the two firms. The effectiveness of
the regulation depends on the structure of the CEO talent market: If the CEO talent market is
competitive on the demand side (i.e., firms have similar sizes), the regulation results in less efficient
shareholder activism.
To understand the intuition, consider two firms: Firm 1 and firm 2 with firm 1 as the larger
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firm. Firm 1 matches with a high talent CEO, and firm 2 matches with a low talent CEO. When
firm 1’s size is similar to firm 2, firm 1’s size advantage is not enough to attract the high talent
CEO, thus, activist 1 optimally sets higher governance deficiencies at firm 1 than activist 2 at
firm 2, whose governance deficiencies are still inefficiently high due to the positive externality.
However, a universal governance deficiency ceiling, which tries to remedy the inefficiency by
reducing governance deficiencies at firm 2, will be too low for firm 1. Under such a regulation,
overregulation occurs and market efficiency decreases.
This paper is related to the literature on shareholder activism externalities. The existing litera-
ture discusses two channels. The first is the product market channel: Activism generates negative
effects on rival firms through product market competition (Aslan and Kumar, 2016). The second
is the threat channel: The possibility of activism disciplines managers and improves performance
at non-target firms (Zhu, 2013; Gantchev et al., Forthcoming; Feng et al., 2018; Bourveau and
Schoenfeld, 2017). This paper identifies a novel channel of externalities that work through inter-
linked firm and CEO outside options. To my best knowledge, this is the first paper to model the
effect of the CEO talent market on the externality and efficiency of shareholder activism.
Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012) analyze corporate governance externalities which
also arise from firms’ competition for CEO talent. Their papers focus on the inefficient contract-
ing between firms and CEOs, while this paper focuses on activists’ inefficient choices of gover-
nance characteristics, which themselves are determinants of the contracting environment studied in
Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012). Thus, this paper is complementary to Acharya and
Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012): Shareholder activism can improve the contracting environment by
decreasing governance deficiencies, however, activism has its own externalities and inefficienicies.
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2 The Model
2.1 Model Setup
I consider a market of one activist, two firms, and three CEOs. A CEO can only work for one firm,
a firm can only hire one CEO, and the activist can only launch an activism campaign at one firm.
CEO j ∈ {1,2,3}’s talent is t j with t1 > t2 > t3. Governance deficiencies, such as the presence
of poison pills or the lack of director independence, are present at both firms. Firms are the same
ex ante: firm i ∈ {1,2}’s governance deficiencies are e¯ and firm i’s size is s. Each firm has 1
share outstanding. For simplicity, I assume the activist fully owns the target firm. CEOs’ talents
{t1, t2, t3} and firms’ governance deficiencies e¯ are common knowledge. CEOs and the activist are
all risk-neutral.
The model has three periods. In period 1, the activist launches a costly activism campaign at
the target firm to reduce its governance deficiencies. For example, the activist incurs a costly proxy
fight to declassify the board. In period 2, firms compete with each other to match with the high
talent CEO. Equilibrium matching pattern and equilibrium payoffs are determined in this period.
In period 3, each firm contracts with its CEO to determine how the CEO will be monitored and
compensated. Figure 1 plots the timing of the model.
The activist en-
gages in share-
holder activism to
reduce governance
deficiencies.
Period 1
Firms compete for
CEOs.
Period 2
Each firm de-
termines how to
monitor and com-
pensate the CEO.
Period 3
Figure 1: Timing of the Model.
Note that the activist’s ownership at the target firm is exogenously given, thus, this paper does
not speak about how the activist’s accumulation of stakes is affected by stock market liquidity or
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strategic interactions between the activist and non-activist shareholders, both of which are exten-
sively studied in the existing literature on shareholder activism.2 Furthermore, by assuming the
activist fully owns the target firm, the externality is not driven by the free-riding from non-activist
shareholders, who receive the benefits of activism without sharing the costs (Grossman and Hart,
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
2.2 Solution
2.2.1 Optimal Contract in Period 3
I focus on a single firm in period 3 and solve the optimal contract between the firm and its CEO.
The period-3 problem is a simplified costly state verification model à la Border and Sobel (1987).
For simplicity, I strip away subscripts from notations.
The firm’s cash flow in period 3 is stochastic: it equals st, the product of firm size and CEO
talent, with probability p and 0 otherwise. The distribution is common knowledge, but the real-
ized cash flow o ∈ {st,0} is only observable to the CEO, who submits a report r ∈ {st,0} to the
firm. Depending on the report r, the firm monitors the CEO by auditing her report with probability
gr and pays an auditing cost of sgr. The effectiveness of auditing decreases in governance defi-
ciencies.3 Conditional on auditing, the firm discovers the realized cash flow with probability 1e ,
where e measures the firm’s governance deficiencies. Apparently, the unconditional probability of
discovering the realized cash flow is gre .
The contract between the firm and the CEO specifies the probability of auditing gr and CEO
compensation {wr,wor}, where wr is contingent on report r if there is no auditing or there is audit-
2For example, Grossman and Hart (1980); Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Maug (1998); Kahn and Winton (1998);
Aghion et al. (2004); Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004); Admati and Pfleiderer (2009); Edmans (2009); Edmans and
Manso (2010).
3For example, as the lack of board independence (a form of governance deficiencies) increases, directors become
more tied to the CEO and more reluctant to oppose the CEO. Thus, board monitoring becomes less effective.
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ing but the firm fails to discover the realized cash flow, and wor is contingent on report r and realized
output o if there is auditing and the firm discovers the realized cash flow. I denote the optimal con-
tract by C = {gr,wr,wor}, which can also be written as C = {gst ,g0,wst ,w0,wst,st ,wst,0,w00,w0,st}
for o,r ∈ {st,0}. The timing of the period-3 contract is shown in Figure 2.
Contract
{gr,wr,wor}
CEO observes the
realized cash flow o
CEO’s report r
Firm observes o and r,
and CEO’s wage is wor
gr
e
Firm only observes r,
and CEO’s wage is wr
1− gre
Figure 2: Timing of Period 3. Note that o refers to the realized cash flow and r refers to the reported cash
flow.
By revelation principle, I look for the truth-telling equilibrium. When the realized cash flow is
st, if the CEO reports truthfully, her wage is wst with probability 1− gste and wst,st with probability
gst
e ; if she falsifies the report, her payoff is w0 + st − 0 with probability 1− g0e and wst,0 with
probability g0e , where st−0 is the difference between the realized and reported cash flow. Incentive
compatibility requires that the CEO prefers reporting the realized cash flow st truthfully:
(
1− gst
e
)
wst +
gst
e
wst,st ≥
(
1− g0
e
)
(w0+ st−0)+ g0e wst,0
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Similarly, when the realized cash flow is 0, incentive compatibility requires
(
1− g0
e
)
w0+
g0
e
w00 ≥
(
1− gst
e
)
(wst +0− st)+ gste w0,st
The firm signs contract C with the CEO to maximize the expected total cash flow pst net of
expected CEO compensation p
((
1− gste
)
wst +
gst
e wst,st
)
+(1− p)((1− g0e )w0+ g0e w00) and ex-
pected auditing cost psgst +(1− p)sg0, subject to a set of constraints including the incentive com-
patibility conditions:
Max
C
pst− p((1− gst
e
)wst +
gst
e
wst,st)− (1− p)((1− g0e )w0+
g0
e
w00)− psgst− (1− p)sg0 (1)
st. p((1− gst
e
)wst +
gst
e
wst,st)+(1− p)((1− g0e )w0+
g0
e
w00)≥ v (PK)
(1− gst
e
)wst +
gst
e
wst,st ≥ (1− g0e )(w0+ st−0)+
g0
e
wst,0 (ICst)
(1− g0
e
)w0+
g0
e
w00 ≥ (1− gste )(wst +0− st)+
gst
e
w0,st (IC0)
w0,w00,w0,st ,wst ,wst,st ,wst,0 ≥ 0 (LL)
wst ,wst,st ≤ st,w0,w00 ≤ 0 (FC)
g0,gst ∈ [0,1]
where PK is the promise-keeping constraint, and v is the promised utility, which satisfies v < pst
in equilibrium (See Section 2.2.2). ICst and IC0 are the CEO’s incentive compatibility constraints
when realized cash flow is st and 0. LL is the limited liability constraint, and FC is the feasibility
constraint. I solve the optimal contract under the assumption of e < pt1−p . If e≥ pt1−p , the firm never
audits the CEO’s report because auditing is too costly.
Lemma 1. The expected CEO compensation equals the promised utility v, and the probability of
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auditing is given by gst = 0 and g0 = e
(
1− vpst
)
.
Lemma 1 shows that g0, the probability of auditing when the reported cash flow is 0, increases
in governance deficiencies e. Intuitively, higher governance deficiencies reduce the effectiveness
of auditing, thus, the firm compensates less effective auditing with a higher probability of auditing.
Lemma 1 also shows that the firm only audits the CEO when she reports the low cash flow. Intu-
itively, the CEO can only benefit from falsely reporting the low cash flow when the realized cash
flow is high. Upon receiving a report of high cash flow, the firm knows the report must be true and
thus decides not to audit it.
Hereafter, I drop gst from the discussion and call g0 the probability of monitoring or monitoring
intensity, which decreases in CEO compensation v. Intuitively, CEO compensation and monitor-
ing are substitutes in incentivizing the CEO to report the realized cash flow truthfully. As CEO
compensation increases, the firm sets a weaker monitoring intensity.
Substituting the optimal contract in Lemma 1 to the firm’s objective function (1) yields the
expected profit function:
pi(s,e, t,v) =
(
1− (1− p)e
pt
)
(pst− v) (2)
Equation (2) shows that firm profit increases in CEO talent and decreases in CEO compensation.
The firm prefers higher CEO talent and lower CEO compensation. However, a more talented CEO
always demands a higher wage in equilibrium. Thus, higher CEO talent is also more costly to
acquire. Section 2.2.2 discusses this tradeoff faced by firms in the two-sided matching market.
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2.2.2 Matching Equilibrium in Period 2
In period 2, the activist has reduced the target firm’s governance deficiencies from e¯, while the non-
target firm’s governance deficiencies stay at e¯. I ask how firms of different governance deficiencies
match with CEOs of different talents and what are their equilibrium payoffs. Hereafter, I call the
non-target firm firm 1 and the target firm firm 2. Apparently, firm 1’s governance deficiencies e1
and firm 2’s governance deficiencies e2 satisfy e¯ = e1 > e2.
The equilibrium matching pattern needs to satisfy the feasibility and stability requirements.
Feasibility requires that firm profit and CEO compensation belong to the utility possibility set,
whose Pareto frontier is defined by equation (2). Stability requires that no firm or CEO prefers to
match with each other or stay unmatched by breaking their current match. To satisfy the stability
requirement, it is necessary to maintain the following assumption throughout this paper:
Assumption 1. e¯ < pt j1−p , j ∈ {1,2,3}
With the upper bound on governance deficiencies imposed by Assumption 1, equation (2)
shows that firms’ profits are always positive, thus both firms will prefer matching with a CEO to
staying unmatched. Clearly, Assumption 1 implies ei <
pt3
1−p , i ∈ {1,2}.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, firm 1 matches with CEO 1, firm 2 matches with CEO 2, and CEO 3 is
unmatched.
A firm with lower governance deficiencies matches with a less talented CEO, thus, there is
positive assortative matching between governance deficiencies and CEO talent in equilibrium. If
governance deficiencies refer to the lack of board independence, Lemma 2 implies that a firm of
higher board independence matches with a CEO of lower talent. Intuitively, lower governance
deficiencies lead to more effective monitoring and lower CEO compensation, which reduces the
firm’s competitiveness for CEO talent.
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Next, I solve equilibrium payoffs, which are generally not uniquely determined for matching
models. In particular, equilibrium payoffs can be parameterized by the least talented CEO (CEO
3)’s compensation v3 in this model. Lemma 2 shows that CEO 3 is unmatched in equilibrium, thus,
I assume CEO 3’s wage equals her autarky payoff, which is normalized to be 0.
Furthermore, the matching model is discrete, thus, there are match-specific rents left for bar-
gaining between firms and their CEOs. Firm i’s profit and CEO i’s wage are solved by the following
Nash bargaining game:
max
pii,vi
(pii−pii,o)1−φi(vi− vi,o)φi (3)
s.t. pii =
(
1− (1− p)ei
pti
)
(psti− vi)
where pii,o denotes firm i’s outside option, v1,o denotes CEO i’s outside option, and φi denotes CEO
i’s bargaining power.
Proposition 1. In the matching equilibrium,
i. CEO 1’s outside option v1,o(e2) strictly increases in firm 2’s governance deficiencies e2, and
firm 1’s outside option pi1,o(e2) strictly decreases in e2.
ii. Firm 1’s profit pi1 = φ1(1− (1−p)e1pt1 )(pst1− v1,o(e2))+(1−φ1)pi1,o(e2) strictly decreases in
both e1 and e2.
Part i. shows that higher governance deficiencies at firm 2 reduce firm 1’s outside option and
increase CEO 1’s outside option. Intuitively, firm 1’s outside option pi1,o is its profit from deviating
to match with CEO 2, and CEO 1’s outside option v1,o is her wage from deviating to match with
firm 2. As firm 2’s governance deficiencies e2 increases, firm 2’s profit becomes lower, its CEO’s
compensation becomes higher, and monitoring becomes weaker. Thus, firm 1’s outside option
deteriorates because CEO 2 is more expensive for firm 1 to match with, and CEO 1’s outside
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option improves because firm 2 is willing to pay more and monitor less to match with CEO 1.
Part ii. shows that higher governance deficiencies at firm 2 reduce firm 1’s profit, which can be
understood from the Nash bargaining game (3) and Part i. Part ii. also shows that the externality is
more related to firm 1’s outside option when CEO 1’s bargaining power is weaker.
Appendix 4 solves firm 1 and CEO 1’s outside options. CEO 1 and CEO 2’s compensation can
be explicitly solved from the Nash bargaining problem (3)
v1(v2) = (1−φ1)
ps(t1− t2)+
(
1− (1−p)e2pt2
)
v2
1− (1−p)e2pt1
+φ1
ps(t1− t2)+
(
1− (1−p)e1pt2
)
v2
1− (1−p)e1pt1
(4)
v2 = φ2
ps(t2− t3)
1− (1−p)e2pt2
(5)
By equation (4), it is easy to verify that v1 < pst1 and v2 < pst2.4 Thus, the assumption of v< pst in
Section 2.2.1 is satisfied in equilibrium. Equation (4) also shows that CEO 1 gains her bargaining
power from her marginal talent over CEO 2: If t1 = t2, she would have the same wage as CEO 2.
Proposition 1 also shows that higher governance deficiencies at firm 1 reduce its profit. How-
ever, firm 1 is the firm matching with the more talented CEO. Thus, higher governance deficiencies
increase a firm’s competitiveness for CEO talent but decrease its profit for a given match. The fol-
lowing corollary shows that firm 1 earns a lower equilibrium profit than firm 2. Thus, the cost of
higher governance deficiencies outweighs the benefit of higher CEO talent in equilibrium.
Corollary 1. In matching equilibrium, pi1 < pi2 and v1 > v2. That is, the firm with strictly higher
governance deficiencies earns strictly lower profit, and the CEO with strictly higher talent earns a
strictly higher wage.
4From equation (4), v1 is strictly increasing in v2. By v2 = φ1 ps(t2−t3)
1− (1−p)e2pt2
< pt2, CEO 1’s wage v1 < v1(v2 = pst2) =
pst1.
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To see why, assume CEO 2’s wage is weakly higher than CEO 1, then firm 2 can form a new
match with CEO 1 and pay her a wage of v2 + ε . For a sufficiently small ε , both firm 2 and
CEO 1 will be better off because firm 2 benefits from a strictly higher CEO talent while paying
a marginally higher wage and CEO 1 earns a strictly higher wage. Firm 2 and CEO 1 will break
their current match and rematch with each other, which violates the stability requirement of the
matching equilibrium. The same argument can be made to show pi1 < pi2.
2.2.3 Shareholder Activism in Period 1
The activist launches an activism campaign in period 1, and firm 2 is the target firm.5 An activism
campaign is costly to the activist, who needs to pay fees on disclosure, compliance, proxy advisors,
governance consultants, and public relation professionals.6 Specifically, the activist incurs a cost
of k2(e¯−e2)2 to reduce the target firm’s governance deficiencies from e¯ to e2. I assume the activism
cost is sufficiently large, k > 1−pe¯ s, such that an interior solution exists on [0, e¯].
7 The payoff to the
activist, who has full ownership of firm 2, is firm 2’s period-2 profit net of period-1 activism costs.
The activist solves the following problem:
max
e2
pi(s,e2, t2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 (6)
where pi(s,e2, t2,v2) is the target firm’s period-2 profit, given by equation (2).
To examine the efficiency of the activist’s solution e∗2, I compare it to efficient governance
deficiencies eo2. I consider a social planner who maximizes total firm profits net of the shareholder
activism cost, while respecting the matching equilibrium in period 2 and the optimal contract in
5The profit from targeting either firm is the same to the activist because firms are the same ex ante.
6Gantchev (2013) finds that an activism campaign ending in a proxy fight has average costs of $10.71 million,
which reduce shareholder returns by more than two-thirds.
7If k ≤ 1−pe¯ , the activist always sets e2 = 0.
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period 3. Efficient governance deficiencies eo2 is solved by
max
e2
pi(s, t1, e¯,v1(e2))+pi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 (7)
where pi(s, t1, e¯,v1(e2)) and pi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2)) are given by equation (2). The activist ignores the
positive externality of her activism campaign, and solving the activist and the social planner’s
problem yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The activist sets inefficiently high governance deficiencies. Formally, e∗2 > e
o
2.
Two comments are in place. First, the cost function k2(e¯− e2)2 only accounts for the variable
cost of shareholder activism. Apparently, conditional on launching the activism campaign, the
presence of a fixed cost will not change the optimal choice of the activist or the social planner.
However, the decision to launch the activism campaign depends on the fixed cost. More formally,
let pi =max
e2
pi(s,e2, t2,v2)− k2(e¯− e2)
2 and pio =maxe2 pi (s, t1, e¯,v1(e2))+pi(s, t2,e2,v2)− k2(e¯−
e2)2. It is easy to prove that pi < pio. If shareholder activism incurs a fixed cost of d and the fixed
cost is mildly large (pi < d < pio), then the activist will not launch the activism campaign while
the social planner will. This suggests that the activist engages in too little activism in the presence
of a fixed cost. Second, by assuming that the activist has full ownership stake in the target firm,
this section does not speak about the free-rider problem: non-activist shareholders benefit from the
activism without sharing the cost. If the activist has fractional ownership in the target firm, the
inefficiency will be driven by both the positive externality and free-riding, which will be discussed
in Section 3.2.
Note that equation (4) and (5) show that both CEOs’ wages increase in firm 2’s governance
deficiencies. It is also clear that both firms’ profits and monitoring intensities decrease in firm 2’s
governance deficiencies. Proposition 2 shows that social planner sets lower governance deficien-
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cies than the activist. Thus, both CEOs’ wages are strictly lower, and firms’ monitoring intensities
and profits are strictly higher under the social planner than under the activist.
3 Extensions
3.1 The Liquidity of the CEO Talent Market
The main model shows that outside options, determined by payoffs from matching with other part-
ners in the market, are important channels to generate externalities. In this section, I consider how
market frictions affect outside options and thus the shareholder activism externality. The friction
I consider is the illiquidity of the CEO talent market: If a match breaks down, a CEO matches
with a new firm and a firm matches with a new CEO with probability λ . Thus, the parameter λ
is a measure of liquidity in the CEO talent market. Conceptually, labor market illiquidity can be
understood as a result of search frictions (the CEO is only successful in locating a new firm with
probability λ ) or the limited transferability of CEO talent (the CEO’s skill is only transferable to a
new firm with probability λ ).8
I first determine the equilibrium matching pattern. Unlike the main model, there may exist
multiple equilibria when CEO talent is not perfectly transferable. For example, if λ = 0, any
equilibrium matching pattern is possible because a matched partner is strictly preferred to any
unmatched partner. In the section, I select the equilibrium matching pattern which can survive any
liquidity parameter λ .
8Note that most theoretical papers in the firm-CEO matching literature implicitly assume that CEO talent is per-
fectly transferable. However, CEO talent has firm or industry-specific components, which limit its transferability.
Custódio et al. (2013) measure the generality of CEO talent using a general ability index (GAI) and find different
levels of generalities among different CEOs: GAI has a mean of zero with a standard deviation of 1, the minimum
GAI is -1.504, and the maximum GAI is 7.23.
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Lemma 3. There always exists an equilibrium matching pattern such that firm 1 matches with
CEO 1, firm 2 matches with CEO 2, and CEO 3 is unmatched.
Next, I discuss equilibrium payoffs under the specific equilibrium matching pattern shown in
Lemma 3. Like the main model, firms and CEOs bargain over the matching surplus, and outside
options are endogenously determined. With probability λ , CEO 1’s outside option is v1,o, which
is CEO 1’s wage from deviating to match with firm 2, and with probability 1−λ , CEO 1’s outside
option is 0. Thus, CEO 1’s expected outside option is λv1,o. Similarly, firm 1’s outside option is
λpi1,o. Firm i and CEO i’s payoffs are given by the following Nash bargaining game:
max
pii,vi
(pii−λpii,o)1−φi(vi−λvi,o)φi (8)
s.t. pii =
(
1− (1− p)ei
pti
)
(psti− vi)
which solves firm 1’s profit pi1 = (1−φ1)(1− (1−p)e1pt1 )(pst1−λv1,o(e2))+φ1λpi1,o(e2).
Similar to the main model, I use e∗2 to denote the activist’s optimal choice of governance defi-
ciencies and eo2 to denote the social planner’s efficient choice of governance deficiencies. The ex-
ternality can be measured by the difference between the private solution and the socially-efficient
solution |e∗2− eo2|.
Proposition 3. The shareholder activism externality is more severe when CEO talent market is
more liquid. Formally, |e∗2− eo2| strictly increases in λ .
Intuitively, when the CEO talent market is more liquid (either because search frictions are
smaller or CEO talents are more transferable), CEO 1 and firm 1’s outside options are more tied
to firm 2’s governance deficiencies e2. For example, when λ = 0, the shareholder activism ex-
ternality disappears because firm 1’s profit is independent of e2. The empirical literature shows
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that CEO talents have become more transferable and outside hires are more pervasive over the last
several decades (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik 2004; Custódio et al. 2013), thus, shareholder activism
externalities play an increasingly important role in determining market efficiency.
3.2 Common Ownership
This section asks whether common ownership—when an activist has ownership in multiple firms—
can improve market efficiency. On the one hand, when an activist cross-holds multiple firms, she
maximizes portfolio firms’ value instead of individual firms’ value, thus, common ownership has
the potential to internalize the positive externality within cross-held firms (Hansen and Lott, 1996;
Rubin, 2006). On the other hand, by spreading ownership into multiple firms, common ownership
reduces the activist’s stake at the target firm, which exacerbates the free-rider problem (Grossman
and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
To understand this tradeoff, I compare an activist (blockholder activist, hereafter) who opti-
mally allocates her ownership in the target firm with an activist (cross-holding activist, hereafter)
who passively cross-holds both the target and non-target firm. I examine whether shareholder
activism is more efficient under the cross-holding activist than under the blockholder activist.
Note that theoretically, the cross-holding activist can launch activism campaigns in both firms.
However, activists generally have small stakes in the target firm and the fixed cost of shareholder
activism is likely to be large.9 I thus make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. The fixed cost of shareholder activism is sufficiently large such that the cross-
holding activist will only engage in shareholder activism in one firm.
The blockholder activist has a total of α < 1 shares. She allocates x ∈ [0,α] shares to the non-
9For example, Brav et al. (2008) show that activist hedge funds’ median ownership in target firms is 6.30%, using
data from 2001 to 2006.
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target firm to capture the positive externality from her activism campaign at the target firm. She
solves the following problem:
max
e2,x∈[0,α]
xpi (s, t1, e¯,v1(e2))+(α− x)pi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 (9)
Lemma 4. The blockholder activist optimally sets x = 0. That is, she concentrates all her stakes
in the target firm.
The explanation is as follows. Corollary 1 shows that the target firm has a strictly higher profit
than the non-target firm. Thus, moving one share to the target firm from the non-target firm strictly
increases the activist’s payoff, and the activist optimally concentrates all her shares in the target
firm.
Lemma 4 implies that instead of internalizing the externality across portfolio firms, consider-
ations such as decreasing product market competition and increasing implicit collusion through
common ownership are more likely to account for the rise of common ownership over recent
years.10
Appendix 4 shows that the optimal governance deficiencies e∗2(α) = e
∗
2 +(1−α)1−pk s > e∗2,
where e∗2 is the activist’s optimal choice of governance deficiencies with 100% ownership stakes
in the target firm; Appendix 4 further shows that
eb2(α) = e
o
2+
1
k
(
1− (1− p)e¯
pt1
)
∂v1(e2)
∂e2︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive externality
+(1−α)1− p
k
s︸ ︷︷ ︸
free-riding
(10)
where eo2 is the social planner’s efficient choice of governance deficiencies. Thus, with fractional
ownership, the inefficiency of shareholder activism is caused by the activist’s failure to internalize
10For recent work on the rise and anti-competitive effects of common ownership, see Azar (2017); He and Huang
(2017); Azar et al. (2018).
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the positive externality and free-riding from non-activist shareholders. Furthermore, equation (10)
shows that the positive externality does not depend on the activist’s position α , thus, assuming full
ownership stakes in the main model yields a general result on shareholder activism externality.
Next, I compare the blockholder activist’s solution with that of the cross-holding activist, who
has a total of α shares and passively allocates y ∈ (0,α) shares in the non-target firm. The cross-
holding activist solves
max
e2
ypi (s, t1, e¯,v1(e2))+(α− y)pi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 (11)
where y ∈ (0,α) are the shares passively allocated in the non-target firm. I use ec2 to denote the
cross-holding activist’s optimal choice of governance deficiencies.
Proposition 4. The cross-holding activist sets higher governance deficiencies at the target firm if
more shares are allocated in the non-target firm. Formally, ∂e
c
2
∂y > 0.
Allocating more shares in the non-target firm enables the activist to better internalize the pos-
itive externality, however, it also exacerbates the free-riding problem from non-activist sharehold-
ers. Proposition 4 implies that the cost of free-riding dominates.
Note that the blockholder activist is an activist with zero shares allocated in the non-target firm.
Thus, Proposition 4 implies that the blockholder activist sets lower governance deficiencies than
the cross-holding activist. Simple comparative statics also shows that the cross-holding activist
earns a strictly lower profit than the blockholder activist. Thus, in the presence of a fixed cost, the
cross-holding activist is less likely to engage in shareholder activism than the blockholder activist.
The discussion is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Compared with concentrated ownership, shareholder activism under common own-
ership is less efficient:
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i. The cross-holding activist launches fewer shareholder activism campaigns.
ii. The cross-holding activist sets higher governance deficiencies.
From 2004 to 2016, index fund assets grew nearly fivefold from $554 billion to $2.6 trillion
and index funds’ share of long-term mutual fund assets more than doubled from 9.0 percent to
19.3 percent (Investment Company Institute, 2017). If index funds—who hold up to thousands
of firms—displace large blockholders, common ownership increases at the expense of concen-
trated ownership. Corollary 2 implies that the increased popularity of index funds can reduce the
efficiency of shareholder activism.11
3.3 Regulation
Can regulation improve the efficiency of shareholder activism? Proposition 2 implies that a regula-
tor can fully restore market efficiency by imposing the efficient level of governance deficiencies eo2
on the target firm. However, in a market with thousands of firms, regulating each individual firm is
highly impractical because of the regulator’s limited access to firm-level information, enforcement
costs, or legal challenges mounted by corporate lobbyists. Thus, I consider a more realistic ap-
proach: The regulator sets a universal governance deficiency ceiling for all firms. For example, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that public firms have fully independent audit, compensation and
governance committees, which essentially sets an upper bound on the lack of board independence
for all US-listed public firms. I ask whether policies like this can help internalize the externality of
shareholder activism and improve market efficiency.
To this end, I modify the main model by considering two activists, who simultaneously launch
11Index funds generally don’t directly engage in shareholder activism. However, Brav et al. (2008) and Appel et al.
(2016) show that passive investors play a key role in influencing firms’ governance choices through their large voting
blocs—passive ownership is associated with less support for management proposals and more support for shareholder-
initiated governance proposals.
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activism campaigns in period 1. Two firms have different sizes, denoted by s1 and s2 for firm 1 and
2. Without loss of generality, I assume s1 ≥ s2. Each activist can only target one firm and each firm
can only be targeted by one activist. I further assume t2 = t3, which implies CEO 2’s wage v2 = 0
(by equation (5)). This assumption greatly simplifies my analysis without changing the model’s
qualitative predictions. The rest of the setup is the same as the main model.
3.3.1 Matching in Period 2
I start from period 2 because period-3 contract is the same as the main model. I consider two can-
didate equilibrium matching patterns: firm 1 matches with CEO 1 (thus, firm 2 matches with CEO
2) and firm 1 matches with CEO 2 (thus, firm 2 matches with CEO 1). Generally, it is challenging
to solve the equilibrium matching pattern when firms differ in both governance deficiencies and
size because matching is multi-dimensional. However, it is possible to characterize the equilibrium
matching pattern with only two firms.
Lemma 5. In the matching equilibrium, CEO 3 always stays unmatched; firm 1 matches with CEO
1 and firm 2 matches with CEO 2
i. when firm 1’s size s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2
ii. if and only if e1 ≥− pt1(s1−s2)(1−p)s2 +
s1
s2
e2 when firm 1’s size s1 ∈ [s2, t1t1−t2 s2)
When firm 1’s size is sufficiently large, it matches with the more talented CEO irrespective
of its governance deficiencies; when firm 1’s size is smaller than t1t1−t2 s2 (but still larger than s2),
it matches with the more talented CEO if and only if its governance deficiencies are sufficiently
large. When both firms’ sizes are the same, Lemma 5 reduces to Lemma 2: The firm with higher
governance deficiencies matches with the more talented CEO.
Intuitively, the equilibrium matching pattern is determined by firms’ competitiveness for CEO
talent. A firm with higher governance deficiencies is more competitive because it offers higher
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CEO compensation, and a firm with a larger size is more competitive because a CEO is more
productive in a larger firm. Thus, when firm 1 is sufficiently large, it outcompetes firm 2 for CEO
talent and matches with the high talent CEO; when firm 1’size is smaller, firm 2 with sufficiently
high governance deficiencies can outcompete firm 1 and match with the high talent CEO.
Figure 3 plots matching patterns under different governance deficiencies, with 1-1 matching
referring to the matching pattern of “firm 1 matches with CEO 1” and 1-2 matching referring to the
matching pattern of “firm 1 matches with CEO 2”. Figure 3b shows the case of s1 ∈
(
s2,
t1
t1−t2 s2
)
,
where the line connecting e¯1 = t1s2+s1t2−t1s1s2t2
pt2
1−p <
pt2
1−p and e2 =
pt1(s1−s2)
(1−p)s1 <
pt2
1−p determines the
boundary of two different matching patterns.12 Note that both e¯1 and e2 decrease in s1, thus, the
1-2 region decreases as s1 increases, that is, the matching pattern of “firm 1 matches with CEO 2”
becomes less likely as firm 1’s size becomes larger.13 When s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2, 1-2 region disappears,
and “firm 1 matches with CEO 1” is the unique matching pattern, shown by Figure 3a; when s1
equals s2, 1-2 regions becomes the largest, shown by Figure 3c.
Next, I solve the equilibrium payoffs. Similar to the main model, I solve the Nash bargaining
game between firm 1 and CEO 1. Equation (4) implies that, with v2 = 0, CEO 1’s wage is given
by
v1 = (1−φ1) ps2(t1− t2)
1− (1−p)e2pt1
+φ1
ps1(t1− t2)
1− (1−p)e1pt1
(12)
if CEO 1 matches with firm 1, and
v1 = φ1
ps2(t1− t2)
1− (1−p)e2pt1
+(1−φ1) ps1(t1− t2)
1− (1−p)e1pt1
(13)
12To prove e1 <
pt2
1−p , it suffices to prove
t1s2+s1t2−t1s1
s2t2
< 1, which is equivalent to (s1−s2)(t1− t2)> 0. And to prove
e2 =
pt1(s1−s2)
(1−p)s1 <
pt2
1−p , it suffices to prove
pt1(s1−s2)
ps1t2
< 1, which is equivalent to s1 <
ps2t1
pt1−pt2 =
t1
t1−t2 s2.
13e¯1 =
t1s2+s1t2−t1s1
s2t2
pt2
1−p decreases in s1 because t2 < t1, and e2 =
pt1(s1−s2)
(1−p)s1 =
pt1
1−p (1− s2s1 ) apparently decreases in
s1.
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(a) s1 ≥ pt1s2−v2pt1−pt2 (b) s2 < s1 <
t1
t1−t2 s2 (c) s1 = s2
Figure 3: Period-2 Equilibrium Matching Patterns. This figure plots different matching patterns under
governance deficiencies (e1,e2)∈ [0, pt21−p ]× [0, pt21−p ]. “1-1” refers to the matching pattern of “firm 1 matches
with CEO 1” and “1-2” refers to the matching pattern of “firm 1 matches with CEO 2”. For Figure 3b,
e¯1 = t1s2+s1t2−t1s1s2t2
pt2
1−p <
pt2
1−p , and e2 =
pt1(s1−s2)
(1−p)s1 <
pt2
1−p .
if CEO 1 matches with firm 2. Firms’ profits depend on the equilibrium matching pattern: pii =(
1− (1−p)eipti
)
(psiti− vi), i ∈ {1,2} if firm 1 matches with CEO 1 and pii =
(
1− (1−p)eipti
)
(psit−i−
v−i), i ∈ {1,2},−i ∈ {1,2}\i if firm 1 matches with CEO 2.
3.3.2 Nash Equilibrium in Period 1
Denote activist i ∈ {1,2}’s governance deficiency choice in period 1 by e∗i . I look for (e∗1,e∗2)
which satisfies: (1) Nash equilibrium in period 1, that is, activist i can not earn a higher payoff by
deviating from e∗i , given the other activist −i’s choice e∗−i. (2) matching equilibrium in period 2,
that is, given governance deficiencies (e∗1,e
∗
2) in period 1, matching is stable.
Despite the simplicity of the model, solving Nash equilibrium is non-trivial because activists’
governance deficiency choices in period 1 affect the period-2 matching, which is complicated by
multidimensionality (firms differ in both governance deficiencies and size). Thus, I consider two
special cases: Firm 1 is sufficiently large, and firm 1 is sufficiently small (but still larger than firm
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2). The lemma below shows that the equilibrium matching patterns are the same under the two
special cases, which greatly simplifies the policy analysis below.
Lemma 6. When firm 1’s size is either sufficiently larger than firm 2 or similar to firm 2, firm 1
matches with CEO 1 and firm 2 matches with CEO 2. Formally, there exists s¯1 > s1 such that for
s1 ∈ [s2,s1]∪ [s¯1,+∞), firm 1 matches with CEO 1 and firm 2 matches with CEO 2.
Next, to examine the efficiency of the competitive market solution (e∗1,e
∗
2), I solve the efficient
levels of governance deficiencies by considering a social planner who sets both firms’ governance
deficiencies to maximize total firm profits net of activism costs.
max
e1,e2
pi (s1, t1,e1,v1(e2))+pi(t2,s2,e2,v2)− k2(e¯− e1)
2− k
2
(e¯− e2)2 (14)
I denote the social planner’s solution by (eo1,e
o
2). The social planner’s solution (e
o
1,e
o
2) and the
competitive market solution (e∗1,e
∗
2) satisfy
Lemma 7. Both activists set inefficiently high governance deficiencies. Formally, eo1 < e
∗
1 and
eo2 < e
∗
2.
Intuitively, activist 2 sets inefficiently high governance deficiencies because she ignores the
positive externality from her activism campaign at firm 2. Furthermore, due to the strategic com-
plementarity between the two activists, activist 1 sets inefficiently high governance deficiencies if
activist 2 sets inefficiently high governance deficiencies.
Next, I consider a regulator who chooses a governance deficiency ceiling er, and both activists
must set the level of governance deficiencies: e1,e2 < er. The proposition below shows that the
structure of the CEO talent market is important for the effectiveness of policy interventions.
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Proposition 5. When firm 1’s size is sufficiently larger than firm 2, the regulator sets the gover-
nance deficiency ceiling at er = eo2, and the market restores to full efficiency. When firm 1’s size is
similar to firm 2, the regulator should do nothing.
Intuitively, the inefficiency of shareholder activism can be remedied by reducing governance
deficiencies at firm 2, whose governance deficiencies are inefficiently high due to the shareholder
activism externality. When firm 1’s size is similar to firm 2, firm 1’s size advantage is not enough to
win the talent competition. Thus, activist 1 optimally sets higher governance deficiencies at firm 1
than firm 2 to match with the high talent CEO. In this case, a governance deficiency ceiling, which
further reduces firm 2’s governance deficiencies to remedy shareholder activism inefficiency, will
be too low for firm 1 such that overregulation occurs and market efficiency further decreases. The
regulator should do nothing.
When firm 1 is sufficiently larger than firm 2, activist 1 optimally sets lower governance defi-
ciencies at firm 1 than firm 2 to match with the high talent CEO because firm 1’s size advantage
is enough to win the talent competition. In this case, a governance deficiency ceiling set at a level
lower than firm 2’s governance deficiencies but still higher than firm 1’s governance deficiencies
can internalize the shareholder activism externality at firm 2 and avoid over-regulating firm 1.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the positive externality of shareholder activism. Shareholder activism strength-
ens the non-target firm’s outside option and weakens its CEO’s outside option, both of which are
linked to the target firm through the market for CEO talent. Shareholder activism leads to lower
CEO compensation, higher firm profit, and more effective monitoring at the non-target firm. Due
to this positive externality, the activist’s intervention is inefficiently low.
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I proceed to discuss how the inefficiency of shareholder activism is affected by the liquidity
of the CEO talent market, common ownership, and regulation. When the CEO talent market
is more liquid—either because of more transferable CEO talent or lower search frictions—the
shareholder activism externality is more severe. I next ask whether common ownership—when an
activist holds ownership stakes in multiple firms—can affect the efficiency of shareholder activism.
Common ownership internalizes the positive externality by holding multiple firms; however, it
also reduces the activist’s stakes at the target firm, which exacerbates free-riding from non-activist
shareholders. I show that the cost of free-riding dominates and common ownership results in less
efficient shareholder activism. I then ask whether a regulator mandating a universal governance
deficiency ceiling can improve market efficiency. I show that the effect of the regulation depends
on the distribution of firm size: If firms have similar sizes, the regulation results in less efficient
shareholder activism and the regulator should do nothing; if one firm is sufficiently larger than the
other, the regulation leads to more efficient shareholder activism.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that ICst and IC0 become stronger if wst,0 and w0,st become smaller, thus, the firm sets
wst,0 = w0,st = 0. LL and FC imply w0 = w00 = 0. The left hand side of IC0 is zero. The right
hand side of IC0 is (weakly) negative because w0,st = 0 and wst − st ≤ 0 (implied by FC), thus,
IC0 is satisfied and the CEO will not falsify a report of st when the realized cash flow is 0. This
implies a report of cash flow st must be true and the firm will not audit the report. Thus, gst = 0.
Substituting w0 = w00 = 0, wst,0 = w0,st = 0, and gst = 0 to program (1) yields
pi (s,e, t,v) = Max
g0,wst
pst− pwst− (1− p)sg0
t.t. pwst ≥ v (PC)
wst ≥
(
1− g0
e
)
st (ICst)
ICst must be binding, if not, the firm can increase its profit by reducing g0. Thus, g0 = e
(
1− wstst
)
.
Substituting wst =
(
1− g0e
)
st to the above maximization problem yields
pi (s,e, t,v) = Max
g0
pst
g0
e
− (1− p)sg0
t.t. pst
(
1− g0
e
)
≥ v (PC)
PC must be binding, if not, the firm can increase its profit by increasing g0, thus g0 = e
(
1− vpst
)
.
This implies wst = vp and the expected CEO compensation pwst = v. Note that substituting g0 =
e
(
1− vpst
)
to the firm’s profit function yields pi (s,e, t,v) =
(
1− (1−p)ept
)
(pst− v).
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Proof of Lemma 2
First, I prove that CEO 3 is unmatched in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, assume firm
i ∈ {1,2} matches with CEO 3, then there must exist an unmatched CEO j ∈ {1,2} who receives
an autarky payoff of 0. Assume CEO 3’s wage is v3 ≥ 0, then firm i’s profit is pi(s,ei, t3,v3).
Because t j > t3, j ∈ {1,2}, thus pi(s,ei, t j,v3)> pi(s,ei, t3,v3). Thus, both firm i and CEO j can be
strictly better off by matching with each other, and CEO 3 is unmatched in equilibrium.
Because firms are only different in governance deficiencies and CEOs are only different in
talents, the matching model is one-dimensional. The firm’s profit function (2) exhibits non-
transferability: a one dollar decrease in CEO compensation does not lead to a one dollar increase
in firm profit. In this case, the equilibrium matching pattern cannot be pinned down by the cross
partial derivative with respect to governance deficiencies and talents (Legros and Newman, 2007).
Instead, I draw the results on matching with nontransferable utilities from Legros and Newman
(2007) and Chade et al. (2017). I use equation (9) of Chade et al. (2017), which is a more tractable
version of Legros and Newman (2007)’s “generalized increasing difference” condition, to prove
Lemma 2. Note that the matching pattern shown in Lemma 2 is positive assortative: a firm of
higher governance deficiencies matches with a CEO of higher talent. Equation (9) of Chade
et al. (2017) implies that PAM is the equilibrium matching pattern if and only if piet (s,e, t,v) ≥
pit(e,t,v)
piv(e,t,v)piev (s,e, t,v), where piet (s,e, t,v) is the cross-partial of the firm’s profit function (2) on e and
t, and pit (s,e, t,v) is the first order derivative of the firm’s profit function on CEO talent t. piev and
piv are similarly defined. Note that piv (s,e, t,v)< 0, thus piet (s,e, t,v)≥ pit(e,t,v)piv(e,t,v)piev (s,e, t,v) can be
written as
piev (s,e, t,v)pit (s,e, t,v)−piet (s,e, t,v)piv (s,e, t,v)≥ 0
Simple algebra yields the sufficient and necessary condition (1− p)(pst− v) ≥ 0, which holds
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because 1≥ p and pst ≥ v.
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove part i., I first solve CEO 2’s wage. CEO 2’s outside option v2,o = 0 because there does
not exist a firm smaller than firm 2. Firm 2’s outside option pi2,o = pi(s,e2, t3,0), which is firm 2’
profit from deviating to match with CEO 3. Solving firm 2 and CEO 2’s Nash bargaining game (3)
yields
v2(e2) = φ1
ps(t2− t3)
1− (1−p)e2pt2
(15)
which strictly increases in e2. To solve firm 1 and CEO 1’s outside option, note that pi1,o(e2) is
firm 1’s profit from deviating to match with CEO 2, thus,
pi1,o(e2) = pi(s,e1, t2,v2) =
(
1− (1− p)e1
pt2
)
(pst2− v2(e2)) (16)
and v1,o(e2) is CEO 1’s wage from deviating to match with firm 2, thus v1,o is solved by pi(s,e2, t1,v1,o)=
pi(s,e2, t2,v2), which yields
v1,o(e2) = pst1−
1− (1−p)e2pt2
1− (1−p)e2pt1
(pst2− v2(e2)) (17)
And because v2(e2) strictly increases in e2, then pi1,o(e2) strictly decreases in e2. Substituting
v2(e2) into v1,o(e2) and after some algebra,
∂v1,o(e2)
∂e2
= (1− p)s1−
pt2−φ1 p(t2−t3)
pt1(
1− (1−p)e2pt1
)2 > 0. That is, v1,o(e2)
strictly increases in e2.
To prove Part ii., note that pi1 can be solved from the bargaining problem (3). And Part i.
implies that pi1 strictly decreases in e2. Furthermore, solving bargaining problem (3) also yields
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CEO 1’s compensation v1 = (1− φ1)v1,o + φ1(pst1− pi1,o
(1− (1−p)e1pt1 )
). Substituting equation (16) and
(17) into v1 yields equation (4).
Proof of Corollary 1
I start with CEO compensation. Note that CEO 1’s wage v1≥ v1,o, where v1,o = pst1−
1− (1−p)e2pt2
1− (1−p)e2pt1
(pst2−
v2) is her outside option. Thus, v1−v2 ≥ v1,o−v2 = (t1− t2)
ps− (1−p)e2pt1t2 v2
1− (1−p)e2pt1
> 0, which holds because
t1 > t2, pst2 > v2 and 1− (1−p)e2pt1 > 0 by Assumption 1. For firm profits, the following holds:
pi1−pi2 =
(
1− (1− p)e1
pt1
)
(pst1− v1)−pi2
≤
(
1− (1− p)e1
pt1
)
(pst1− v1,o)−pi2
=
(
1− (1− p)e1
pt1
)pst1− pst1+ pi2
1− (1−p)e2pt1
−pi2
=
1− (1−p)e1pt1
1− (1−p)e2pt1
−1
pi2 < 0
The first inequality holds because v1 ≥ v1,o, and the second inequality holds because e1 > e2.
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting v2(e2) = φ2
ps(t2−t3)
1− (1−p)e2pt2
into the activist 2’s objective function
(
1− (1−p)e2pt2
)
(pst2 −
v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)2, it is straightforward to show the objective function is strictly concave in e2.
First order condition yields the activist’s optimal solution e∗2 = e¯− (1−p)sk . Under the assumption
of k > 1−pe¯ s, e
∗
2 ∈ [0, e¯].
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The social planner’s problem (7) can be written as
max
e2
(
1− (1− p)e¯
pt1
)
(pst1− v1(e2))+
(
1− (1− p)e2
pt2
)
(pst2− v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 (18)
with v1(e2) given by equation (4). The second order condition for (18) is
SOC =−
(
1− (1− p)e1
pt1
)
∂ 2v1(e2)
∂e22
− k
By equation (4), after some algebra, ∂
2v1(e2)
∂e22
> 0. Thus, SOC < 0. The social planner’s objective
function (18) is strictly concave. First order condition yields the social planner’s optimal choice
eo2 = e
∗
2− 1k
(
1− (1−p)e¯pt1
)
∂v1(e2)
∂e2
< e∗2.
Proof of Lemma 3
The Lemma can be proved more formally by showing that both CEOs and firms will not deviate to
match with other partners in the market. However, this lemma is essentially a corollary of Lemma
2. Lemma 2 shows that firm 1 will not match with CEO 2 in equilibrium when CEO talents are
perfectly transferable. This result is stronger when CEO 2’s talent is only partially transferable to
firm 1. The same logic applies to firm 2 and CEO 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
I first solve CEO 2’s wage. CEO 2’s outside option v2,o = 0 because there does not exist a firm
smaller than firm 2. Firm 2’s outside option pi2,o = pi(s,e2, t3,0), which is firm 2’ profit from
deviating to match with CEO 3. Solving firm 2 and CEO 2’s Nash bargaining game (8) yields
v2(e2,λ ) = φ2
ps(t2−λ t3)−(1−λ )s(1−p)e2
1− (1−p)e2pt2
.
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The activist’s problem is max
e2
pi(s,e2, t2,v2(e2,λ ))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 . It is straightforward to ver-
ify that the objective function is strictly concave, thus, the first order condition yields the activist’s
optimal choice of governance deficiencies e∗2 = e¯− 1−φ2(1−λ )k s(1− p). The social planner’s prob-
lem (7) can be written as
max
e2
(
1− (1− p)e¯
pt1
)
(pst1− v1(e2,λ ))+
(
1− (1− p)e2
pt2
)
(pst2− v2(e2,λ ))− k2(e¯− e2)
2 (19)
with v1(e2) = (1− φ1)λv1,o + φ1(pst1− λpi1,o
(1− (1−p)e1pt1 )
). Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, the
outside options are given by
pi1,o(e2,λ ) =
(
1− (1− p)e1
pt2
)
(pst2− v2(e2,λ ))
v1,o(e2,λ ) = pst1−
1− (1−p)e2pt2
1− (1−p)e2pt1
(pst2− v2(e2,λ ))
It is straightforward to verify that the objective function (19) is strictly concave (after some te-
dious algebra). First order condition yields the social planner’s optimal choice eo2 and e
∗
2− eo2 =
1
k
(
1− (1−p)e¯pt1
)
∂v1(e2,λ )
∂e2
. Note that ∂
2v1(e2,λ )
∂λ∂e2
= (1−φ1)
(
∂v1,o
∂e2
+λ ∂
2v1,o
∂e2∂λ
)
−φ1
(
∂pi1,o
∂e2
+λ
∂2pi1,o
∂λ∂e2
)
1− (1−p)e1pt1
. It is
easy to verify that ∂v1,o∂e2 > 0,
∂ 2v1,o
∂λ∂e2
> 0, ∂pi1,o∂e2 < 0, and
∂ 2pi1,o
∂λ∂e2
< 0. Thus,
∂ (e∗2− eo2)
∂λ
=
1
k
(
1− (1− p)e¯
pt1
)
∂ 2v1(e2,λ )
∂λ∂e2
> 0
That is, shareholder activism externality is more severe when the CEO talent market is more liquid.
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Proof of Lemma 4
Denote pib(x) =maxe2 xpi (s, t1, e¯,v1(e2))+(α−x)pi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯−e2)2. By the envelope
theorem, ∂pib(x)∂x = pi (s, t1, e¯,v1(e
∗
2))−pi(s, t2,e∗2,v2(e∗2))< 0, where “<” follows from Corollary 1.
The blockholder activist optimally chooses x = 0, that is, she concentrates all her stakes in the
target firm.
With x = 0, the blockholder activist’s optimal choice is eb2 = argmaxe2 αpi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))−
k
2(e¯−e2)2. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, αpi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯−e2)2 is strictly concave
in e2, thus, the first order condition yields the optimal solution eb2(α) = e¯− α 1−pk s. And the
proof of Proposition 2 shows that e
∗
2 = e¯− 1−pk s, thus, e∗2(α) = e∗2 + (1−α)1−pk s > e∗2. Using
eo2 = e
∗
2− 1k
(
1− (1−p)e¯pt1
)
∂v1(e2)
∂e2
from the proof of Proposition 2, I can show that
eb2(α) = e
o
2+
1
k
(
1− (1− p)e¯
pt1
)
∂v1(e2)
∂e2︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive externality
+(1−α)1− p
k
s︸ ︷︷ ︸
free-riding
Proof of Proposition 4
The result can be proved using simple comparative statics. Denote
f (y,e2) = ypi (s, t1, e¯,v1(e2))+(α− y)pi(s, t2,e2,v2(e2))− k2(e¯− e2)
2
Then ∂
2 f (y,e2)
∂y∂e2
=
(
1− (1−p)e¯pt1
)(
−∂v1(e2)∂e2
)
+(1− p)s. Note that
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∂v1(e1,e2)
∂e2
= (1−φ1) ps(t1− t2)+φ2 ps(t2− t3)
(1− (1−p)e2pt1 )2
(1− p)
pt1
+φ1
(
1− (1−p)e1pt2
)
φ2
1− (1−p)e1pt1
ps(t2− t3)(
1− (1−p)e2pt2
)2 (1− p)pt2
< (1−φ1) ps(t1− t2)+ ps(t2− t3)
(1− (1−p)e2pt1 )2
(1− p)
pt1
+φ1
1− (1−p)e1pt2
1− (1−p)e1pt1
ps(t2− t3)(
1− (1−p)e2pt2
)2 (1− p)pt2
(20)
< (1−φ1) ps(t1− t3)
(1− (1−p)e¯pt1 )2
(1− p)
pt1
+φ1
1− (1−p)e1pt2
1− (1−p)e1pt1
ps(t2− t3)(
1− (1−p)e¯pt2
)2 (1− p)pt2
< (1−φ1) ps(t1− t3)
(1− (1−p)e¯pt1 )2
(1− p)
pt1
+φ1
ps(t2− t3)(
1− (1−p)e¯pt2
)2 (1− p)pt2
where the first inequality is obtained by setting φ2 = 1, the second inequality is from e2 < e¯, and
the third inequality is from
1− (1−p)e1pt2
1− (1−p)e1pt1
< 1. Thus,
(
1− (1−p)e¯pt1
)
∂v1(e1,e2)
∂e2
(1− p)s < (1−φ1)
p(t1− t3)
(1− (1−p)e¯pt1 )
1
pt1
+φ1
p(t2− t3)(
1− (1−p)e¯pt2
) 1
pt2
= (1−φ1) p(t1− t3)pt1− (1− p)e¯ +φ1
p(t2− t3)
pt2− (1− p)e¯
< (1−φ1)+φ1 = 1
where the first inequality is implied by (20) and the second inequality is by Assumption 1. Thus,
∂ 2 f (y,e2)
∂y∂e2
=
(
1− (1−p)e¯pt1
)(
−∂v1(e2)∂e2
)
+(1− p)s > 0, and the cross-holding activist’s optimal choice
of governance deficiencies ec2 strictly increases in y, her stakes in the non-target firm.
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Proof of Lemma 5
The matching is multidimensional because firms differ in both governance deficiencies and size.
Thus, existing results on one-dimensional matching (e.g., Becker, 1973; Legros and Newman,
2007) cannot be applied here. However, there are only two firms and two CEOs in the model, thus,
there are only two possible matching patterns, and I can use the stability requirement to find out
the equilibrium matching patterns.
Consider that both firms submit wage offers to CEO 1. Denote vi1 as firm i’s highest wage offer
for CEO 1. Firm i prefers to match with CEO 1 if and only if pi(si,ei, t1,vi1)≥ pi(si,ei, t2,v2), where
pi(si,ei, t2,v2) is firm i’s profit by matching with CEO 2. Firm i’s maximum wage offer for CEO 1
is thus solved by pi(si,ei, t1,vi1) = pi(si,ei, t2,v2), which yields v
i
1 =
psi(t1−t2)
1−ei 1−ppt1
by noting that v2 = 0
under the assumption of t2 = t3. Firm 1 matches with CEO 1 if and only if it outbids firm 2, that
is, v11 ≥ v21, which yields e1 ≥− pt1(s1−s2)(1−p)s2 +
s1
s2
e2. When s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2,
− pt1(s1− s2)
(1− p)s2 +
s1
s2
e2 ≤− pt1(s1− s2)
(1− p)s2 +
s1
s2
pt2
1− p
=
p
(1− p)s2 (s1t2− t1s1+ t1s2)≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from e2 <
pt2
1−p (Assumption 1). Thus, when s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2 , e1 ≥
− pt1(s1−s2)(1−p)s2 +
s1
s2
e2 always holds ,and firm 1 always matches with CEO 1.
Proof of Lemma 6
I prove a stronger version of Lemma 6: For s1 = s2 or s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2, firm 1 matches with CEO 1 and
firm 2 matches with CEO 2 in period 2, and the unique Nash equilibrium in period 1 is given by
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e∗1 = e¯−
(1− p)
k
(
s1− (1−φ1) ps2 (t1− t2)pt1− (1− p)e∗2
)
(21)
e∗2 = e¯−
1− p
k
s2 (22)
To prove (e∗1,e
∗
2) is the unique Nash equilibrium, I show that (1) given (e
∗
1,e
∗
2), matching is
stable, (2) activist i’s optimal choice of governance deficiencies is e∗i , given the other activist’s
choice e∗−i.
I first prove the matching is stable. When s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2, Lemma 5 shows that “firm 1 matches
with CEO 1” is the unique equilibrium matching pattern. Thus, period-2 matching is stable for any
given (e∗1,e
∗
2). When s1 = s2 = s, clearly, e
∗
1 > e
∗
2 , and Lemma 2 implies that period-2 matching is
stable.
Next, I prove that (e∗1,e
∗
2) is the Nash equilibrium in period 1. When s1 ≥ t1t1−t2 s2, “firm 1
matches with CEO 1 and firm 2 matches with CEO 2” is the unique equilibrium matching pat-
tern by Lemma 5. Given matching with CEO 2, activist 2 solves maxe2
(
1− (1−p)e2pt2
)
(ps2t2−
v2)− k2(e¯− e2)2, which yields e∗2 = e¯− 1−pk s2; given matching with CEO 1, activist 1 solves
maxe1
(
1− (1−p)e1pt1
)
(ps1t1− v1(e1,e∗2))− k2(e¯− e1)2 which yields
e∗1 = e¯−
(1− p)
k
(
s1− (1−φ1) ps2 (t1− t2)pt1− (1− p)e∗2
)
Thus, (e∗1,e
∗
2) is the Nash equilibrium when s1 ≥ s¯1. When s1 = s2 = s, I first prove the existence of
a pure Nash equilibrium by using the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem. First, activists’ strategy set
[0, e¯] is compact and convex. Second, when ei ≤ e−i, firm i matches with CEO 2, and pi(ei,e−i) =(
1− (1−p)eipt2
)
(pst2− v2)− k2(e¯− ei)2, which is concave in ei; when ei > e−i, firm i matches with
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CEO 1, and pi(ei,e−i) =
(
1− (1−p)eipt1
)
(pst1− v1(e−i))− k2(e¯− ei)2, which is also concave in ei.
Third, I prove that pi(ei,e−i) is continuous in e−i, which is clearly true for e−i < ei and e−i > ei for
a given ei, thus, I only need to prove pi(ei,e−i) is continuous at e−i = ei. The left limit
lim
e−i→e−i
pi(ei,e−i) =
(
1− (1− p)ei
pt1
)(
pst1− lim
e−i→e−i
v1(e−i)
)
− k
2
(e¯− ei)2
=
(
1− (1− p)ei
pt1
)pst1− ps(t1− t2)+
(
1− (1−p)eipt2
)
v2
1− (1−p)eipt1
− k
2
(e¯− ei)2
=
(
1− (1− p)ei
pt1
)
(pst2− v2)− k2(e¯− ei)
2 = lim
e−i→e+i
pi(ei,e−i)
Thus, pi(ei,e−i) is continuous at e−i = ei. pi(ei,e−i) is continuous in e−i on [0, e¯]. Similarly, I can
prove that pi(ei,e−i) is continuous in ei on [0, e¯]. Thus, pi(ei,e−i) is continuous on [0, e¯]× [0, e¯].
According to the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan theorem, there exists a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Next, it is easy to show that any ei 6= e∗1 and ei 6= e∗2 cannot be optimal for activist i whether firm i
matches with CEO 1 or CEO 2. Thus, (e∗1,e
∗
2) is the unique Nash equilibrium for s1 = s2 = s. By
continuity, (e∗1,e
∗
2) is the unique Nash equilibrium if s1 is sufficiently close to s2.
Proof of Lemma 7
The social planner’s objective function (14) is concave (see the proof of Proposition 2). The first
order condition yields (eo1,e
o
2).
eo1 =e¯−
(1− p)
k
(
s1− (1−φ1) ps2 (t1− t2)pt1− (1− p)eo2
)
(23)
eo2 =e¯−
1− p
k
s2− 1k
(
1− eo1
1− p
pt1
)
∂v1(eo2)
∂eo2
(24)
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Comparing equation (22) and equation (24) yields eo2 = e
∗
2−
(
1− eo1 1−ppt1
)
∂v1(eo2)
∂eo2
< e∗2. By equation
(21), equation (23), and e∗2 > e
o
2, I can prove e
o
1 < e
∗
1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Denote the universal governance deficiency ceiling by er. The regulator maximizes total firm
profits net of activism costs, subject to activists’ incentive constraints:
max
e1,e2,er
pi (s1,e1, t1,v1 (e2))+pi (s2,e2, t2,v2)− k2 (e¯− e1)
2− k
2
(e¯− e2)2
s.t. e1 = min{er,e∗1}
e2 = min{er,e∗2}
First, equation (23) shows that eo1 is strictly decreasing in s1. Equation (12) shows that
∂v1(eo2)
∂eo2
is independent of s1, thus, eo2 is independent of s1 by equation (24). Therefore, when firm 1’s size
s1 is sufficiently larger than firm 2’s size s2, eo1 < e
o
2. Let the regulator set er = e
o
2. Under such
a regulation, activist 2 sets her optimal choice of governance deficiencies at eo2 = er because her
objective function is quadratic in e2. Comparing equation (21) and (23) shows that if activist 2 sets
governance deficiencies at the efficient level, activist 1 optimally sets governance deficiencies at
the efficient level eo1, which satisfies the regulatory constraint because e
o
1 < e
o
2 = er.
When s1 = s2. Note first that e∗1 > e
∗
2 when s1 = s2 (see the proof of Lemma 6). I consider two
cases when er is binding. First, if e∗2 < er < e
∗
1, then activist 2 sets firm 2’s governance deficiencies
at e∗2; activist 1 sets firm 1’s governance deficiencies at er because her payoff is quadratic in e1
and e∗1 is her optimal choice without regulation. Activist 2 earns the same payoff and activist 1 is
strictly worse off under the regulation. The regulator should do nothing. Second, the regulator sets
er ≤ e∗2. Activist 2’s payoff function is quadratic and maximized at e∗2 without regulation, thus she
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sets e1 = er under the regulation. By equation (21), activist 1’s payoff is maximized at
e¯− (1− p)
k
(
s1− 12
ps2 (t1− t2)
pt1− (1− p)er
)
> e∗2 ≥ er
where the first inequality can be proved similar to the proof of e∗1 > e
∗
2 (see the proof of Lemma
6). Thus, activist 1 sets e1 = er under the regulation because her payoff is quadratic in e1. Because
both activists choose er, they will earn the same payoff. Thus, maximizing total activists’ payoffs
is equivalent to maximizing activist 2’s payoff
max
er
(
1− (1− p)er
pt2
)
(ps2t2− v2)− k2 (e¯− er)
2
and the regulator sets er = e∗2. Compared with the unregulated market outcome, activist 2 earns
the same payoff, and activist 1 earns a strictly lower payoff. By the continuity argument, when
firm 1 and firm 2’s sizes are sufficiently similar, the regulator should do nothing instead of setting
a universal governance deficiency ceiling for the two activists.
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